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9. Apprenticeship in England 
 
Patrick Wallis 
 
 
 
In 1766, Sir William Blackstone gave the following definition of apprenticeship in his 
influential treatise on the English common law: 
 
 ‘Another species of servants are called apprentices (from apprendre, to learn) and are 
usually bound for a term of years, by deed indented or indentures, to serve their 
masters, and be maintained and instructed by them… This is usually done to persons 
of trade, in order to learn their art and mystery.’1 
 
Blackstone’s definition offers a useful starting point for an investigation of apprenticeship in 
early modern England. Most historical, anthropological or economic analyses of 
apprenticeship would recognise Blackstone’s description of apprenticeship as the exchange of 
labour services for maintenance and instruction. Apprenticeship was then, as it remains, the 
primary mode of vocational training, allowing workers to fund their education in general 
skills by taking a lower wage (in England then, usually just food and lodging). It is a system 
used for trade -- not agriculture. But Blackstone’s definition also highlights aspects of 
apprenticeship that were more specific to England. To him, apprenticeship requires a long 
term (‘of years’), a formal written contract in a specific form (‘indentures’), and maintenance 
as well as instruction. Apprentices are servants, but of a particular kind.  
 That Blackstone discussed apprentices in a commentary on law is also significant. For 
among the variety of forms of service that existed in England, apprenticeship was understood 
as a distinct legal practice. Apprenticeship was tied to a particular contractual form and 
duration. It placed youths in a specific legal position of formal subordination. From the 1560s 
to the early 1800s, experiences of service sometimes shaded into each other -- domestic 
servants picked up craft skills, apprentices hauled water and swept floors. However, in city 
halls and guild meetings, in Quarter Sessions and Parliament, the status of apprenticeship was 
understood to be unique. The reasons for this arguably had little do with the needs of 
apprentices or masters, and instead reflected the functions that apprenticeship had been 
assigned as the basis for exclusive claims to welfare rights, guild membership, citizenship 
and the right to practice an occupation. 
 One legacy of the legal significance of English apprenticeship is the enormous 
volume of records that survive. Apprenticeship was registered, taxed, examined and 
monitored. Each step left a paper trail. We probably have more information about apprentices 
in England than in any other pre-modern state. In part because of this, it has a long, rich 
historiography that has examined a range of issues, from the guilds’ ability to protect child 
labour, to the socialization of youths, and, recently, the efficiency of human capital formation 
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and its contribution to England’s distinctive early industrialisation.2 Thanks to the work of 
many historians, notably Cliff Webb, large volumes of apprenticeship records are now 
digitised, allowing us to see how apprenticeship operated in practice. In this chapter, I 
examine the political economy, scale and distribution, relation to family strategies, openness, 
and local institutions of apprenticeship. Several broader questions underlie my discussion. 
Was apprenticeship in England an institution that embedded inequality, redistributing rents to 
insiders? Was it, alternatively, an unusually efficient system of training? Did guilds somehow 
sustain apprenticeship? And, throughout, the issue of to what extent was English 
apprenticeship different to that found elsewhere in Europe? 
  
 The Framework of Service 
 In the history of English apprenticeship, one moment stands out: the passing of the 
Statute of Artificers in 1562.3 From that date until its repeal in 1814, a completed seven-year 
apprenticeship was a legal requirement to work in most crafts or trades. No equivalent 
restriction applied in agriculture. No similar national law existed elsewhere in Europe. 
 From 1562, the institutional space in which apprenticeship existed was defined by 
three sets of actors: guilds, town and city governments, and – because of the Statute – 
magistrates. Not all existed in all locations. Independent magistrates were the only relevant 
authority in rural areas. Guilds operated in many towns and cities in the sixteenth century, but 
the scale of their activities often declined in the eighteenth century – although the exact 
chronology of their weakening remains unclear. Urban governments had a long-standing 
interest in apprenticeship and, outside of London and a few other cities, defined the role of 
guilds that operated under their sufferance and supervision, while city governors sat as 
magistrates in their own courts.  
 To say that the Statute invented an English system of apprenticeship would be a 
mistake. Certainly this was not its intention. The authors of the law aimed to keep labour on 
the land. To the crown and a Parliament dominated by large landowners, abundant cheap 
farm labour and social stability were both appealing targets. The Statute expanded upon 
earlier laws that sought to stop the rural poor from becoming urban artisans. Its 
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apprenticeship clauses were designed to limit occupational and geographical mobility. For 
example, only those with land worth 40 shillings a year could apprentice their children to 
‘merchants, Mercer, Draper, Goldsmith, Ironmonger, Imbroiderer or Clothier’ in corporate 
towns.4  
Ironically, the effect of the Statute was probably the opposite of Parliament’s 
intentions. By raising a protective barrier around artisanal labour, it increased the incentives 
to enter a craft or trade. What constituted an apprenticeship was not even closely examined 
within the Statute; instead it generalized the 'custom of London’. The mode of the metropolis 
was made the manner of the nation. The Statute’s most visible consequence was fixing the 
long seven-year minimum term. This remained the English norm into the nineteenth century. 
Elsewhere, terms were generally shorter and variable. It also generalized a single form of 
contract, one narrower and less flexible than the more open, individualized agreements used 
elsewhere in Europe. 
 The three most distinctive consequences of the Statute of Artificers lay outside the 
cities. Firstly, one urban form of apprenticeship now applied nationwide: rural artisans were 
subject to the same contract and rules as those in Norwich or London. Secondly, a completed 
apprenticeship became a nationwide qualification. Seven years of service established one’s 
right to work. In contrast, England’s guilds and cities usually demanded that an 
apprenticeship be served locally, to a citizen or freemen, to qualify for guild membership 
(these rules remained after 1567, limiting the Statute’s effect in towns, and marked an 
important difference to much of Europe). Thirdly, the Statute put the policing of 
apprenticeship into the hands of England’s magistrates. Justices of the Peace would thereafter 
judge disputes between masters and apprentices. In theory, at least, the Statute created a 
national skilled labour market supervised by the main local agents of the state. 
 Within England’s towns and cities, the Statute of Artificers did not change 
apprenticeship much in the short term. City and guild ordinances that had been building up 
since the thirteenth century anticipated its main contents. London’s customs had already 
become a benchmark for urban apprenticeship elsewhere. No national machinery was created 
to register apprenticeships and ensure compliance; instead enforcement was left to informers 
bringing law suits to local courts.5 There is little evidence that the social limitations the 
Statute set on entry to apprenticeship were observed; inflation soon pulled their teeth 
anyway.6 It was only from the late seventeenth century onwards, as judges questioned the 
power of restrictive guild and city by-laws and most guilds lost interest in trade regulation, 
that the Statute became critical to urban artisans’ privileges. Journeymen, rather than guilds, 
increasingly promoted cases under the Statute to stop individuals who had not served seven-
year apprenticeships from working.7 At the same time, the scope of Statute was gradually 
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whittled back through narrow judicial interpretations that freed a range of trades from its 
requirements, as laissez faire principles spread through the judiciary.8  
 Inside incorporated cities, town governments and guilds were the primary bodies 
involved in apprenticeship. Their efforts focused on two areas: monitoring entry and 
resolving disputes, which is discussed below. Voluminous records survive from guilds and 
cities’ systems to register apprenticeships. These records allowed them to check later claims 
to access based on service, and to enforce quotas on apprentice taking. At this point, many 
carried out a simple entry examination, to ensure that only ‘suitable’ youths entered service. 
However, the bars to entry they created focused on age, disability, nationality, and - very 
occasionally - literacy. Parallels to modern educational systems break down here: suitability 
was based on identity not aptitude. For example, London apprentices must be ‘Englishmen 
born’, between 14 and 21 when bound and at least 24 when they finished, and not lame or 
disabled. Only three London guilds, the Goldsmiths, Barber-Surgeons and Apothecaries, 
included a requirement for literacy, the latter in Latin. It is hard to say if these bars were 
tightly enforced. Their impact would have been small, at any rate. Similarly, the fees that 
guilds and cities charged for registering apprenticeships were generally low. A period in the 
fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries in which London guilds deployed high fees to restrict 
apprenticeship had led to Parliament imposing a statutory limit of 2s 6d in 1530.9 Thereafter, 
few guilds demanded more.10 As in much of Europe, these financial barriers were relatively 
trivial, equating to less than a week’s wages for an unskilled construction worker. 
 Masters too, faced restrictions from guilds and cities about taking apprentices. These 
potentially had a bigger effect on the supply of apprenticeship. In cities, masters usually had 
to be freemen, or freemen’s widows, for their apprentices to gain any claim to citizenship or 
freedom. Most important, though, were guild limits on the numbers of apprentices each could 
train.  
 Nearly all guilds set quotas per master on apprentice numbers. Most were low. Only 
four of twenty-two London guilds surveyed allowed ordinary members more than two 
apprentices at a time; guild officials usually benefited from an additional spot. The main 
justification for these rules was to ensure adequate employment for guild members – which, 
in England, usually included journeymen as well as masters. In 1618, for example, the 
London Clothworkers successfully petitioned the city for its help in limiting apprentices 
because ‘the multitude’ bound recently had led to the 'great increase of the number of’ 
clothworkers, creating 'great misery and want' through lack of work.11 Given that apprentices 
were concentrated in the workshops of a small share of masters (see below), quotas also 
lowered inequality, making it harder for masters to use apprentices to expand. While these 
rules surely affected which master apprentices joined – by capping their concentration in 
certain firms – the sheer volume of apprenticeship that occurred suggests that their main 
effect was to displace youths into the hands of less desirable masters. 
 One other distinctive political development affected apprenticeship in early-modern 
England: the passing of the poor laws in 1598 and 1601. England’s poor relief system heavily 
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utilized a form of apprenticeship as a welfare strategy. Parishes placed children from poor 
families into apprenticeships with householders, who would maintain them in exchange for 
service. The degree to which training was given is unclear. The poor laws envisaged paupers 
learning ‘husbandry and huswifery’, and ‘menial tasks in the fields’ was the lot of most 
children in the seventeenth century; yet there is also evidence of parishes seeking to ensure 
youths gained a useful trade.12 Generally pauper apprentices were younger, around 9 or 10 
years old, and the expectation of menial duties, not learning a skill, means they are not the 
focus of this chapter.  
 The poor law had a second implication. Once serving an apprenticeship became one 
of the ‘grounds’ for settlement in 1691, apprentices acquired the right to claim relief in the 
parish in which they trained. This added a further incentive to enter apprenticeship.13 
 The terms of the contract of apprenticeship that were referred to in the Statute of 
Artificers had developed in London by the thirteenth century.14 The master promised 
instruction and subsistence. The apprentice – normally represented by his father or mother – 
offered service and subordination: he promised to follow orders, avoid taverns, not play at 
cards or games, to spurn fornication and marriage, work hard, and keep his master’s secrets. 
These moral requirements were strongly stated. However, the details of what was to be 
learned were not specified. Apprentices’ ages and the minimum duration were set by city law 
and, later, Statute. Masters took all their apprentice’s earnings, while paying apprentices 
wages was banned in London - although some apprentices did receive recompense.15 The 
contract was written twice on the same sheet and then cut, so each copy could be verified by 
matching the serrated edge (hence its name ‘indenture’). Contracts were transferrable with 
both parties’ agreement (and, where relevant, guild or city approval), allowing apprentices to 
move masters. By the seventeenth century, contracts were pre-printed, with gaps left for the 
details.  
 Contracts were formulaic in England. Usually, only one aspect was adjusted to fit the 
circumstances of each apprenticeship: the size of the material and financial commitment each 
party made. Most other aspects, notably duration, were essentially fixed by law. 
Personalization took different forms. Some masters promised payments in clothing, cash or 
tools at the end of terms – Gloucester apprentices in the sixteenth century usually received 
‘double apparel’ on completion, for example – giving apprentices an incentive to complete.16 
Some apprentices’ families lowered masters’ costs by supplying clothing. This could be a 
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substantial contribution: John Coggs, a stationers’ apprentice, went through six pairs of shoes 
a year, costing almost two pounds of his mother’s money in 1703-4.17 A few families placing 
children in mercantile and trading businesses entered bonds ‘for truth’, to secure masters 
against any losses from the apprentice’s neglect or dishonesty.  
 Most famously, apprentices and their families might pay a fee or ‘premium’ to their 
master when they started their training. Premiums were negotiated privately, with no guild or 
city involvement, and were never necessary for apprenticeship; even in the eighteenth 
century, large numbers of apprentices did not pay fees, as table 1 shows. The timing of trends 
in fees is unclear. Payments from masters in the form of clothing, cash and tools at the end of 
apprentices’ terms seem to have declined from 1600 onwards. Apprentices’ families may 
then have become more likely to pay fees: they were frequent enough to attract the eye of the 
state, which taxed them from 1711.18  
 
Table 9.1. London training premiums, companies, and selected occupations, 1710-1800 
  
 Paying 
premium 
% 
Average 
£ 
Sd 
£ 
Median 
£ 
P10 
£ 
P90 
£ 
N 
Companies 
Apothecaries 84 73 36 63 40 105 585 
Blacksmiths 23 11 17 6 3 21 2832 
Grocers 53 88 91 60 5 200 705 
Plasterers 28 12 15 7 4 20 683 
Stationers 46 36 44 20 5 100 4428 
Turners 52 13 15 10 4 26 816 
Vintners 30 21 36 11 5 30 1628 
Clothworkers 36 36 57 20 5 84 5862 
All companies 33 36 54 15 5 100 15403 
  
Occupations 
Bookbinder 43 15 14 10 4 30 879 
Bookseller 47 90 82 70 11 200 714 
Druggist 69 203 112 200 100 315 59 
Grocer 64 101 94 92 25 200 200 
Haberdasher 79 61 39 50 21 100 119 
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Instrument 
maker 
59 16 19 10 5 30 299 
Plasterer 28 8 4 6 5 15 204 
Printer 35 21 20 19 4 40 2691 
Stationer 51 79 80 50 10 190 905 
Blacksmith 17 7 3 7 3 10 53 
Turner 64 12 7 10 5 25 87 
Dyer 37 12 10 10 5 20 251 
Tailor 56 14 12 10 5 30 100 
Butcher 29 12 8 11 5 21 169 
Calenderer 14 8 8 5 3 14 545 
Watchmaker 57 17 16 15 5 30 194 
Engraver 74 33 28 25 10 60 307 
Note: The table reports premiums in eight London companies. Panel A is grouped by guild; panel B 
by master’s reported occupation. N is the total number of observations, including those with zero 
premiums. The descriptive statistics (cols 3-7) are for observations with positive premiums. Source: 
Minns and Wallis, ‘Price of human capital’. 
 
By altering fees, offering end-payments or negotiating over who paid for maintenance 
and clothing, masters and apprentices served both to balance supply and demand and provide 
incentives for completion. In short, within the strictures set by national and local laws, there 
was an active market for training.19 But while premiums and payments offered a price 
mechanism to clear the market for new apprenticeships, the rigidity and length of the required 
term created a high opportunity cost that, as we will see, stretched the viability of many 
contracts.  
 
 
Incidence 
 Apprenticeship occurred on an extraordinarily large scale in early modern England. It 
was employed across almost the full range of skilled and semi-skilled non-agricultural 
occupations. For youths looking to a future in industry, trade or services, apprenticeship was 
a normal step between family and independence as an adult, just as service in husbandry was 
a conventional stage in a life in agriculture.20 But whereas farm service was widely spread, 
apprenticeship – especially in the sixteenth century – was highly concentrated. Four features 
stand out about the distribution of apprenticeship: the sheer size and durability of 
apprenticeship; the centrality of London; the comparatively low levels of apprenticeship in 
other cities; and the dramatic increase in rural apprenticeship in the eighteenth century. One 
could say that Parliament’s decision to base the Statute of Artificers on the custom of London 
made sense, given that a big share of apprentices were already subject to those rules. 
 These key features of the distribution of English apprenticeship are illustrated by 
Table 2, which reports new estimates for the number of youths starting apprenticeships in 
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 Minns and Wallis, Price of human capital’; Feldman and van der Beek, ‘Skill choice’. 
20
 Ann Kussmaul, Servants in Husbandry in Early Modern England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
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England. Columns 1 and 2 give estimates for guild or city-registered apprenticeships in towns 
and cities around 1600 and 1700. For London, I extrapolate from existing guild and city 
records. For other towns, I use estimates of the number of apprentices per thousand people, 
calculated from surviving registers, and multiply them by the number of cities in each size 
category. This is obviously a rough and ready approach. It is also, by definition, an under-
estimate: urban registers under-record the actual numbers of indentures.21  
Guild and city records become untenable as the foundation for an estimate in the 
eighteenth century. Many ceased to register apprenticeships, while some growing towns, such 
as Birmingham and Manchester, were not incorporated and so lacked the infrastructure to 
record apprenticeships. Fortunately, from 1711 records survive from the Stamp Tax, a levy of 
between 2.5 and 5 percent on apprenticeship premiums. These records only cover 
apprenticeships in which the master received a premium. But they extend over the entirety of 
the country, allowing us to examine rural apprenticeship. Columns 3 and 4 report counts of 
fee-paying apprentices for the 1710s and 1790s. 
  
 Table 9.2. Annual entries to apprenticeship in England, 17th-18th centuries 
 Apprentices in Incorporated Cities Apprentices paying Premiums 
 c. 1600 c. 1700 c. 1710 c. 1790 
Urban     
London 3,000-4,000 c.4,000 1,960 1,020 
Towns >10,000 365( 162-597) 586 (288-1060) 451 862 
Towns 5,000-10,000 484 (293-641) 806 (488-1068) 443 299 
Small boroughs - - 602 871 
Urban Sub-Total 4,349 (3,455-5,238) 5,392 (4,776-6,128) 3,458 2,610 
Rural Sub-Total - - 1,605 3,155 
Total - - 5,226 5,782 
     
Share of teenage males 
(%) 8-13 11-14 11 8 
Share of teenage males 
outside ag. (%) 24-37 21-26 20 13 
     
Note: Columns 1 & 2 are based on the following assumptions. In 1600, aside from London, England had four 
cities with more than 10,000 inhabitants (Norwich, York, Bristol and Newcastle), and 15 with 5,000 to 10,000. 
By 1700, 6 towns exceeded 10,000 inhabitants, and 25 had 5,000 to 10,000 (E.A. Wrigley, ‘Urban Growth and 
Agricultural Change: England and the Continent in the Early Modern Period’, Journal of Interdisciplinary 
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History 15, no. 4 (1985), 686). We calculate the numbers of apprentices per inhabitant at various points between 
1600 and 1800 for Boston, Bristol, Coventry, Gloucester, Ipswich, Kings Lynn, Leicester, Lincoln, Liverpool, 
London, Northampton, Oxford, Southampton and St Albans. For small towns, we find a median of 4.3 
apprentices per thousand people and an interquartile range of 2.6-5.7. For large towns, the median is 6.3 (2.8-
10.3) apprentices per thousand people. Cols 1-2 give the median and interquartile range once multiplied by the 
number of towns in each category. Columns 3 & 4 are based on 6-year samples of IR1 (for 1712-1717 and 
1792-1797); part of the underlying data was kindly shared by Karine van der Beek. Urban populations are 
derived from de Vries and Langton. The additional category of small boroughs are incorporated towns with a 
population over 1,000 in 1832. Estimates of 16 year old males outside agriculture are derived from E. A.  
Wrigley et al., English Population History from Family Reconstitution, 1580-1837 (Cambridge University 
Press, 1997), 614-5, 134. For 1600 we assume 65% of the male population are employed in agriculture (Patrick 
Wallis, Justin Colson and David Chilosi, ‘Structural Change and Economic Growth in the British Economy 
before the Industrial Revolution, 1500–1800’, Journal of Economic History 78, no. 3 (2018), 862-903). For 
1700 and 1800, we use Broadberry et al’s figures of 46% and 36% of males in agriculture (Stephen Broadberry,  
Bruce M. S. Campbell and Bas van Leeuwen, ‘When Did Britain Industrialise? The Sectoral Distribution of the 
Labour Force and Labour Productivity in Britain, 1381–1851’, Explorations in Economic History 50 (2013), 
24).  Estimates of the share of non-agricultural workforce outside towns assume that all urban workers are non-
agricultural, and define the urban population as the share living in towns over 5,000 given in Wrigley, ‘Urban 
Growth’, 688. 
 
 Apprenticeship’s large scale and enduring popularity is most evident when we 
compare the numbers who started indentures with the number of teenage males – the 
population from which they were primarily drawn. In 1600 and 1700, around one in ten 
teenage males started apprenticeships in a city or town. In the 1790s, eight percent of teenage 
males started fee-paying apprenticeships, compared to eleven percent at the start of the 
century.  
 There is little sign here of sharp cycles in the popularity of apprenticeship over these 
two centuries. Although historians have long debated the ‘decline’ of apprenticeship in 
England, table 9.2 suggests that apprenticeship remained vigorous through the eighteenth 
century.22 It is only in the guilds that apprentice registrations declined steeply, as the ability – 
and interest – of many guilds in enforcing local limits on economic activity weakened.23  
Private apprenticeship did not retreat quickly in parallel with the guilds. There was 
some erosion in its significance: as employment outside agriculture rose in the eighteenth 
century, premium-paying apprentices fell from twenty to thirteen percent of all youths 
working in manufacturing or services between the 1710s and 1790s. But this may overstate 
developments, as industrialization meant that some of the new jobs were in low and semi-
skilled tasks where apprenticeship had limited relevance.  
Individual trades and towns had specific histories that were more varied than this 
national average suggests. In some trades, loud complaints about unapprenticed workers 
emerged in the eighteenth century. Calico printers, shearmen and stocking weavers fought for 
jobs and wages by strengthening or re-establishing apprenticeship.24 In others, journeymen 
accused masters of recruiting excessive numbers of apprentices as cheap labour. In 
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 The debate is well surveyed in Snell, Annals. Later major contributions include L. Schwarz, London in the 
Age of Industrialisation: Entrepreneurs, Labour Force and Living Conditions, 1700–1850 (Cambridge: 
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 The many and growing gaps in guild and urban regulation are charted in Dunlop and Denman, English 
Apprenticeship; Stella Kramer, The English Craft Guilds: Studies in Their Progress and Decline (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1927). See, however, M. Berlin, ‘Guilds in decline? London Livery Companies and 
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Spitalfields, rioting by silk weavers in 1719 was blamed on ‘the covetousness of both masters 
and journeymen in taking so many ‘prentices for the sake of the money they have with them; 
not considering whether they should have employment for them.’25  
It is uncertain how widespread such problems were, however. Few premodern trades 
were organised in a way that made apprentices central to production, in the way that child 
workers were to become in textile mills. And as guilds withdrew, journeymen often began 
campaigns to maintain apprenticeship via closed shops.26 Moreover, the estimates in table 2 
are partial: the Stamp Tax just counted apprentices who pay premiums, and many did not. We 
thus cannot be sure if overall numbers are changing or just the share paying fees. 
Nevertheless, the impression of persistence they provide coheres well with Jane Humphries’ 
conclusion that apprenticeship remained commonplace for working-class youths into the 
early nineteenth century.27 
 London dominated urban apprenticeship in the seventeenth century. The great 
majority of England’s urban apprentices were in London. The city’s three to four thousand 
new apprentices a year around 1600 or 1700 was three to four times the number starting 
training in all England’s other large towns combined. In the late seventeenth century, roughly 
one in ten of all English teenage males started an apprenticeship in London. This equates to 
one in five youths working outside agriculture. As Wrigley noted, London’s disproportionate 
size and rapid growth depended on sucking in youths from across the nation.28 The impact on 
the city was particularly acute around 1600, when apprentices supplied around six to eight 
percent of the city’s population (assuming a 60 percent survival rate); the social and political 
importance of apprentices in protest was rooted in this numerical heft.29  
 England’s second and third tiers of cities played a much smaller part in 
apprenticeship. Where London faced a flood, these cities saw a trickle. In Lincoln - 
population c.4,000 in 1700 - just 14 new apprentices a year were indentured in the mid-
seventeenth century. In Gloucester, a county town with around 5,000 residents, around 40 to 
50 apprentices were indentured each year in the seventeenth century. At least twice as many 
youths from Oxfordshire trained in London as in Oxford.30 Even Bristol, the country’s third 
largest city, received only 180 apprentices annually around 1600 and about 250 around 1700, 
when its population reached about 24,000 people. Every year more apprentices were 
registered in London's larger guilds – the Merchant Taylors, Haberdashers, Weavers - than in 
Bristol. Still, Bristol was relatively important in training: its density of apprentices came 
close to that of London. Almost seven percent of Bristol’s population were apprentices in 
1600, and around four percent in 1700 (assuming 60 percent survived). In most towns, 
apprentices were one to two percent of the population. Apprentices were less important to 
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trade and manufacturing outside London, just as these towns were less important to 
apprenticeship. 
 Apprenticeship became less metropolitan, less urban and more geographically 
diffused in the eighteenth century. London remained the largest centre of training in Britain, 
but its exceptionality was reduced. In the 1710s, 39 percent of apprentices paying premiums 
in England were indentured to London masters. By the 1790s, this had fallen to just 18 
percent. To put this another way, in the 1710s, London received almost four times the number 
of apprentices that its share of England’s population (11 percent) would predict; in the 1790s, 
it attracted roughly twice the share its population share (10 percent) suggested.  
 
Figure 9.1. Maps of the distribution of apprenticeships with premiums in England and Wales, 
c. 1710 and c.1790 
 Apprenticeship, c. 1710    Apprenticeship, c. 1790 
  
 
Note: The maps plot apprenticeships with premiums in the 1710s and 1790s where masters are in identifiable 
locations. Locations are represented by circles weighted by apprentice numbers. For 1710, a six year sample 
contained 30,542 indentures; 85.2% were successfully geo-located. For 1790, the six year sample contained 
36,102 indentures; 84.6% were successfully geo-located. Sources: IR1. 
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 Outside London, apprenticeships were distributed widely by the late eighteenth 
century, as map 1 shows.31 Masters in small centres – hamlets, villages, old market centres 
and new manufacturing towns – were recruiting premium-paying apprentices to a degree not 
found previously. The rest of England’s established towns and cities (those with a population 
of 5,000 by 1800) took a constant fifth of apprentices. Some of this diffusion of training 
reflected the transformative effect of industry. In Lancashire, for example, the small hamlet 
of Hardshaw-within-Windle saw eleven apprentices in the 1790s, up from none in the 1710s, 
as it was drawn into the manufacturing and coal-mining town of St Helens (whose population 
would exceed 5,000 in the 1830s).32 The growth of clock-making in the area is apparent from 
their master’s trades: four joined masters who made watches or watch-parts; the rest were 
bound to a surgeon, a draper, a carpenter, a cooper, a saddler and a joiner. Half paid less than 
£10, and just two paid more than £20 – those bound to the surgeon and the joiner. Similarly, 
Rainhill, a small township in the same county, saw three apprentices in the 1790s, against 
none in the 1710s.33 Two made watch parts and one became a saddler.  
 Yet much of England remained largely untouched by industrialization in this period, 
and apprenticeship was increasingly concentrated in these duller backwaters. In Bedfordshire, 
it was small hamlets such as Old Warden, where the local carpenter Thomas Preston bound a 
youth for £6, or Ridgmont, where two cordwainers and a wheelwright each took an 
apprentice (for £5, £10 and £18 respectively) that saw apprentices bound for premiums in the 
1790s, yet had seen none in the 1710s.  
By the 1790s, it was the largely agricultural counties of Norfolk and Leicestershire 
that had the highest rates of apprenticeship per person, with 1.26 and 1.09 fee-paying 
apprentices per thousand inhabitants. Industrial Lancashire ranked thirty-fifth out of forty-one 
English counties with just 0.29 apprentices per thousand.34 In the Lancashire cotton industry 
or the woollen manufacturing of the West Riding of Yorkshire, formal indentures in trades 
such as weaving were rare in the late eighteenth century; that said, these were areas where 
proto-industry had long relied heavily on training within the family.35 The five cities with the 
highest concentrations of apprentices in the 1790s were Exeter, King’s Lynn, Cambridge, 
Ipswich, and Norwich. These were not the heartland of industrialization; they were slow-
growing, relatively peripheral places in the East or South where traditional forms of 
employment and business organisation still predominated. Many of the trades youths entered 
were occupations servicing commercial agriculture: saddlers, blacksmiths, corn dealers and 
so on.  
 Because the Stamp Tax only applied to premium-paying apprentices, it is possible 
that the diffusion of apprenticeship that we see in table 1 and map 1 reflects changes in the 
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use of premiums, not apprenticeship itself. Perhaps village boys had been bound as often in 
the 1710s, but without fees? We cannot easily reject this hypothesis without evidence, that 
has not yet been found, on the frequency of rural apprenticeships without premiums. 
However, there is little sign that apprentices were paying higher premiums, which we might 
also expect if demand was outstripping supply, and fee-paying apprenticeship was gradually 
becoming less common overall.36  
 This expansion in rural apprenticeship was part of a wider rebalancing of 
apprenticeship in this period. The diminishing importance of London as a source of training 
implies that more apprenticeships happened elsewhere. Many youths who trained in London 
would later return home – a quarter of provincial apprentices reappear in their parish of 
birth’s vital records, either marrying, baptising a child or being buried.37 If fewer youths were 
making that initial journey, while the numbers working in industry and services was growing, 
then we would expect more youths to be training in the provinces, as we observe.  
 One consequence of this shift from London to the provinces was a reversal in the flow 
of skilled workers. Where skill had once spread outwards from London, as youths 
apprenticed in the city then migrated, by the mid-nineteenth century the metropolis was 
stocked with workers who had trained in small towns. In construction, for example, Mayhew 
suggested that in the 1850s three-quarters of carpenters were ‘from the country’, having 
moved to London as journeymen.38 The decline of guild powers encouraged this. English 
guild rules had favoured training within the guild; entry for people trained elsewhere was 
often prohibitively expensive. Now, provincial journeymen became acceptable. 
 We can see in outline a slow change in other aspects of apprenticeship. Over the 
seventeenth and eighteenth century, apprentices in London became younger – the age they 
started fell from nearly 18 years old around 1600 to 15.5 by 1800.39 (Apprenticeship always 
came after the age at which children received elementary education in literacy and 
numeracy). Terms also became shorter and less varied. Agreements beyond seven years 
became rare, although they had been relatively common in the sixteenth century.40 In some 
trades, by the late eighteenth century, even shorter apprenticeships started to appear -- 
although mainly outside corporate towns.41 There is a sense in which apprenticeship became 
more predictable.  
 One final caveat needs to be stated about the balance of urban and rural 
apprenticeship. Until the Stamp Tax (and the introduction of settlement examinations, which 
occurred around the same time) we are almost entirely ignorant of apprenticeships outside 
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corporate towns. Yet these were surely always the great majority of apprenticeships.42 Small 
towns, villages and the countryside were where the great majority of manufacturing and 
service work occurred. Without guilds, however, the evidence is scanty. Quarter sessions 
records, settlement examinations, and diaries and memoirs all suggest that rural 
apprenticeship was largely consistent with urban norms, but we still know too little about the 
subject.43  
 Apprenticeship appears ubiquitous taken in the aggregate. Yet the distribution of 
apprentices across urban households and workshops was highly uneven. Romantic images of 
the artisanal household with master, wife, journeymen and apprentice as stock characters are 
deceptive. Many, perhaps most, guild members in London never took apprentices.44 Forty 
percent of the city’s freemen apothecaries took no apprentices, for example.45 Those masters 
who did take apprentices often had just one or two over their lifetimes. Only a small minority 
of masters trained multiple apprentices over long careers. As Pelling showed for Norwich, 
these large employers often pushed up against guild limits on apprentice numbers.46  
 Most apprentices were bound to one of the rare masters who taught large numbers. In 
London, sixty percent of apprentices joined masters who taught five or more apprentices. 
Some masters would bind more than twenty over their careers, although they rarely had more 
than one or two at a time. These large masters charged higher premiums over time, as their 
experience and reputation grew; training became part of their business.47 It was also this 
group who attracted the ire of the smaller masters and journeymen, for taking too large a 
share of the trade or preferring cheap apprentices to waged journeymen. Most apprentices 
would not replicate the success of their master. In Gloucester, for example, only 15 percent of 
apprentice shoemakers or weavers would later take apprentices themselves.48 Training was 
concentrated, rather than distributed. Only a minority of masters had the volume of work, 
capacity, reputation and interest to attract numerous apprentices. 
 
Who was apprenticed? 
 One crucial issue for our understanding of early modern apprenticeship is how 
accessible it was to different people. If access to training was restricted to a specific group, 
whether by formal rules or informal norms, then it would be socially unjust and economically 
pernicious. Given that the right to skilled work was tied to completion, apprenticeship would 
be another institution generating rents for insiders.49  
                                                          
42
 Pelling, Common Lot, 119-20. 
43
 The fullest discussion remains: Snell, Annals. 
44
 Exact estimates are complicated by the difficulty of matching by name across registers. Estimates from a 
sample of 8 London guilds, suggest at least 40 to 50 percent of freemen did not take apprentices.  
45
 Patrick Wallis, ‘Medicines for London: The Trade, Regulation and Lifecycle of London Apothecaries, C. 
1610-C.1670’ (D.Phil, University of Oxford, 2002), 170. 
46
 Pelling, Common Lot, 216-19 
47
 Minns and Wallis, ‘Price of human capital’, 348-49. 
48
 Barlow, Gloucester: xx. 
49
 For the fullest discussion of this, see S. Ogilvie, ‘Guilds, efficiency, and social capital: Evidence from 
German proto-industry’, Economic History Review 57 (2004), 286-333, Sheilagh Ogilvie, ‘How does social 
capital affect women? Guilds and communities in early modern Germany’, American Historical Review 109 
(2004), 325-59; Sheilagh Ogilvie, ‘“Whatever is, is right”? Economic institutions in pre-industrial Europe,’ 
Economic History Review 60 (2007), 649-84.  
Wallis, England  15 
 
 At the simplest level, this charge does not appear to hold for apprenticeship in early 
modern England. Apprenticeship encompassed the children of rich and poor, townsmen and 
country folk, farmers and merchants. It was an open institution. To a large extent, recruitment 
on the scale just described necessitated this. Statutory restrictions on who could enter urban 
crafts seem to have had little effect – and there is little evidence of attempts to enforce them 
at law.50 Nor did guilds impose tight social restrictions on entry. 
 Still, the opportunity to enter an apprenticeship was not evenly spread across society. 
Apprenticeship came with costs: it removed a pair of productive hands from a household at 
the age they finally became valuable. It took time and money to arrange: youths needed a 
stock of clothing at the very least. These direct financial barriers were probably more 
important than Statute, guild rules or exclusive artisanal norms in defining the prospects of 
children. Premiums, particularly, were a source of inequality. Fees were lower than has 
sometimes been thought. As we saw (Table 1), median premiums were five to ten pounds in 
most trades. Nonetheless, with unskilled provincial wages hovering around twelve pounds a 
year, these were difficult sums for poorer families, even with the chance of assistance from 
parish or charity. One inevitable effect was that poorer children largely ended up in the least 
prosperous trades.51 The rich – and well-connected urban children whose might escape 
paying – had an important advantage in the labour market. 
 Because city and guild registers record the occupations of apprentices’ fathers, we can 
examine the degree of inequality in urban apprenticeship (Table 3). Poverty had a substantial 
impact. The low share of apprentices whose fathers were described as labourers suggests that 
movement into (non-pauper) apprenticeship was relatively rare for these families. Labourer 
might be an under-used label, given that apprentices had some control over the wording of 
indentures, but a great gulf existed between these figures and the numbers of labourers in the 
population. In 1688, King put 43 percent of the population into his class of ‘labourers, 
cottagers and paupers’; more recent estimates are lower,  
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Table 9.3. Backgrounds of Apprentices in English towns and cities, 17th-18th centuries 
 
London Gloucester Boston Lincoln Leicester   
 
1600-25 1600-25 1650-75 1650-75 1646-48   
A. Parental occupation/status 
  
Gentleman (%) 13.9 6.5 9.9 9.7 0.9   
Yeoman (%) 34.7 26.8 12.1 19.4 10.4   
Husbandman (%) 7.7 18.8 7.7 8.1 16.5   
Labourer (%) 0.7 3.7 9.9 17.7 10.4   
Parental Sector 
 
Agriculture (%) 54.5 52.4 30 41.9 31.6   
Manufacturing (%) 29.2 37.3 48.6 46.5 55.1   
Services (%) 16.3 10.3 21.4 11.6 13.3   
 
100 100 100 100 100   
B. Ties 
 
Local origin (%) 14.7 27.2 
 
44.4 45.7   
Same occupn. (%) 
 
10.9 10.6 26.9 16.8   
Father is master 
(%) 0.2 0 11.2 0 14.5   
Father deceased 
(%) 30.8 
 
21.7 4.4 34.2   
      
  
N  37,457 616 91 62 115   
N guilds 58       
        
 
London Gloucester Boston Lincoln Bristol Liverpool Shrewsbury 
 
1700-25 1700-25 1700-25 1750-75 c. 1690 1700-25 c. 1690 
A. Parental occupation/status 
Gentleman (%) 9.1 4.8 3.2 3.4 8.3 16.4 22.4 
Yeoman (%) 8.1 21.8 6.3 3.4 12.8 14.5 5.6 
Husbandman (%) 4 0 0 1.5 0.3 17.8 2.4 
Labourer (%) 4.2 5.8 10.5 13.1 2.2 0.8 0.8 
Parental Sector 
Agriculture (%) 19 27.6 23.9 33.5 22.7 42.2 10.4 
Manufacturing (%) 51.2 58.5 47.8 46.2 51.1 29.6 68.8 
Services (%) 29.7 13.9 28.4 20.4 26.2 28.2 20.8 
 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
B. Ties 
Local origin (%) 47.1 52.4 2.7 38.9 45.3 10.3 38.6 
Same occupn. (%) 11.1 20.5 6.3 18 19.2 4.7 25.6 
Father is master 
(%) 2.9 0 11.7 0 9.7 1 15.4 
Father deceased 
(%) 22.4 
 
4.9 16 
 
21.4 13.6 
        
N  48,669 1037 95 268 2,135 366 125 
N guilds 67      5 
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Note: Panel A reports the reported occupation/status of apprentices’ fathers, expressed as a share of all 
apprentices with relevant information. Rows 5-7 follow Wrigley’s Primary, Secondary, Tertiary classification. 
Panel B reports the share of apprentices with ties, as defined in T. Leunig, C. Minns and P. Wallis, ‘Networks in 
the pre-modern economy: The market for London apprenticeships, 1600-1749’, Journal of Economic History 71 
(2011), 413-43. Sources: London: C. Webb, London Apprentices 44 vols. (London: Society of Genealogists, 
1996–2007), London Livery Companies Online (rollco.org), and Scott (Merchant Taylors); Bristol: Bristol 
Record Office, 04353/2; Gloucester: Barlow, Gloucester; Boston and Lincoln were kindly supplied by the 
Lincoln Family History Society; Leicester: H. Hartopp (ed.), Register of the Freemen of Leicester, 1196-1770 
(Corporation of the City of Leicester, 1927); Liverpool: M. Power, F. Lewis, and D. Ascott, Liverpool 
Community, 1649-1750, SN: 3882 (Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive, 1998); Shrewsbury: Shropshire 
Archives MS6001/126 (Glovers); 6001/4263 (Mercers); 6001/5837 (Tailors); 6001/3360 (Weavers); 6001/4583 
(Smiths). 
 
yet still far in excess of the 4 percent of apprentices paying premiums in the early eighteenth 
century who were identified as labourers’ children.52 In London, between 1500 and 1799, 
only 2 percent of apprentices were sons of labourers. Higher shares are sometimes observed. 
In 1650-74, 18 percent of Lincoln apprentices were labourers’ sons. But Gloucester, 
Liverpool, Bristol, Boston were all similar to London. These are private apprenticeships; the 
share of labourers’ children among pauper apprentices was presumably much higher. 
 At the other end of the social distribution, sons of gentlemen were relatively 
numerous: 13 percent of apprentices across these samples, compared to the 1.4 percent of the 
population King estimated. London attracted many – more than 30,000 gentry sons in the 
seventeenth century alone – but so did Liverpool, with its prosperous merchant houses. Even 
smaller cities saw substantial numbers. Many merchants and wholesalers came from gentry 
families. The degree of gentility of these fathers has long been debated. Were they merely 
socially-aspirational large farmers – ‘parish gentry’, in Brooks’ words? Some probably were, 
but a considerable number can be traced in contemporary lists of armigerous gentlemen.53 
These people had asserted a credible claim to gentility before the officials responsible for 
defining the status; they include Members of Parliament and Justices of the Peace. The 
Surrey gentleman Arthur Onslow’s eldest son, Richard, became Chancellor of the Exchequer 
in 1715; his fourth son, Henry, had been apprenticed in the Grocers’ Company in 1683. 
 Wealth aside, some other potential biases had little effect. There was little preference 
for local children. Instead, apprenticeship was tightly entangled with migration. Roughly 
speaking, the distance that apprentices travelled varied inversely to a town’s population. 
London’s apprentices, in particular, had often journeyed long distances. This was in part a 
demographic necessity: the metropolis only supplied 15 percent of its own apprentices in the 
early seventeenth century when it was growing most rapidly. Smaller cities, too, depended on 
apprentice migration. Around 1600, in Southampton and Gloucester, just a third apprentices 
were locals.  
 Nor did masters limit entry to the sons of those already in the trade. Many apprentices 
came from a background in agriculture, not manufacturing or services. In the first quarter of 
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the seventeenth century, 55 percent of London apprentices and 52 percent of Gloucester 
apprentices were from farming backgrounds, compared to perhaps 60 to 65 percent of the 
population.54 A century later, 19 percent of London apprentices, 28 percent of Gloucester and 
25 percent of Boston apprentices were from farming families. By that stage, agriculture 
employed around 40 percent of adult males. Both migrants and youths changing trade tended 
to pay higher premiums; mobility had its price, probably because of the greater risk of 
contracts failing early.55 Yet apprenticeship was, and remained, a well-travelled road between 
sectors and occupations.  
 The largest ‘missing’ group among apprentices were women. This was not because of 
formal restrictions. Female apprentices were rarely banned in England. Only one London 
guild, the Weavers’, is known to have proscribed training ‘any mayde damsel or other 
woeman whatsoever’. Women could become freemen of London and many other cities via 
apprenticeship.56 But expectations about gender roles and marriage (the husband’s freedom or 
citizenship superseded his wife’s rights, at least in London) lowered the incentive to invest in 
girls’ human capital. Girls placed in pauper apprenticeships usually learned ‘housewifery’. 
Many must have learned trades from their parents. Private apprenticeships of women were 
rare, however.  
In London, roughly one percent of apprentices registered by guilds were female, as 
were perhaps five percent of apprentices paying premiums in the eighteenth century.57 Guild 
records probably underestimate training; as Amy Erickson has suggested, female apprentices 
were more likely to be bound for shorter terms, as meeting the Statutory requirement was less 
important to them, and so might not be registered.58 Nonetheless, there can be no doubt that 
women were far less frequently apprenticed than men. Female apprentices often joined a 
small number of trades, particularly millinery or another clothing trades, although examples 
occur in most occupations.59 In some cases, parents did invest substantial sums; Erickson has 
tracked a cluster of respectable families apprenticing their daughters to milliners in the 1700s 
with premiums of £30 to £60.60 Unusually, their contracts named both husband and wife as 
master, suggesting that it was the mistress who would train them.  
 Most apprentices were entering different occupations to their father. But for children 
born into craft or trade families, apprenticeship was less obviously a mechanism for 
occupational mobility. The most obvious examples are those youths who were bound to their 
fathers. In London, master’s sons supplied just 2 percent of apprentices, but they made up 15 
percent in Shrewsbury in the 1690s and in Leicester in the 1650s. That sons entered contracts 
with their fathers highlights one tension between the Statute of Artificers, which did not 
recognise any form of skill inheritance for artisans’ sons, and that of cities and guilds, which 
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frequently gave masters’ sons the right to claim membership by inheritance.61 By formalising 
within-family training as an apprenticeship, fathers made the years their sons spent working 
with them transferrable, should they die or fail in trade, and legally meaningful.  
 Christopher Brooks has argued that the openness of apprenticeship declined in the late 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.62 This pathway into the urban community narrowed and 
contributed to the rise of urban oligarchies. Signs of this can be found in the narrowing of 
migration fields over the seventeenth century. By 1700, for example, Gloucester supplied 
more than half of its own apprentices; just 6 percent now travelled more than 25 miles. 
Similarly, London now gathered almost half of its apprentices from Middlesex. Migrant 
apprentices were much more likely to come from the south east, although some did still travel 
further. The share of freemen entering by patrimony also rose.  
On the other hand, there is no evidence that these developments resulted from 
deliberate decisions by cities or guilds. The freedom of some London guilds did become a 
more costly proposition, but apprenticeship outside guilds was sustained, and premiums did 
not rise in real terms, as we would expect if guilds were raising barriers. Increasingly local 
recruitment may simply reflect the growth of manufacturing outside the old cities, and the 
slowing of London’s breakneck rate of expansion. Better provincial opportunities meant that 
prospective apprentices no longer needed to travel. Elsewhere in Europe, youths tended to 
train near their families, allowing parents to support their children, and one imagines that 
English parents would have favoured this too. Conversely, London was now able to supply 
more of its own apprentices, and it was increasingly accessible to skilled adult migrants.63 To 
see this as period as marked by the closing off of the city to outsiders seems an exaggeration, 
in short. 
 
Apprenticeship and Family Structure 
 The point, and the desirability, of apprenticeship varied between families, depending 
on their occupation, wealth, local inheritance system, and family size. The choices families 
made about which child to apprentice illustrate this clearly. In gentry families, apprentices 
were usually younger sons; few eldest sons were apprenticed, as one would expect in a 
situation in which landed wealth (and status) was transferred through primogeniture. Instead 
they studied law or spent time at a university. The odds of apprenticeship increased with each 
step down the birth order, as figure 1 shows.  
 Farming families, headed by yeomen or husbandmen, echoed the gentry’s habit of 
mainly apprenticing younger sons, suggesting that for elder sons inheriting the farm trumped 
migration into town.64 Conversely, urban inheritance was often partible and urban resources 
and  
Figure 9.2. The effect of Birth Order on Education and Training among gentry 
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Source: Wallis and Webb, ‘Education and training’, 49. The figure reports the destination of sons in a sample of 
gentry families, by birth order. 
 
networks were already tied to crafts and trade. Hence, for children of the urban middling sort 
birth order mattered little. In poor families rural norms were reversed: labourers’ eldest sons 
were more likely to be apprenticed, as opportunities were directed towards eldest sons.  
 Yet individual interest mattered too. That urban families placed children into 
apprenticeships largely independent of birth position suggests that their ability and 
enthusiasm played a part in defining who followed what pathway. Certainly, Robert 
Campbell’s advice to parents emphasised the importance of matching the ‘Genius and 
Temper’ of children to their career.65 Ben-Amos has shown how youths usually had a voice 
in choosing their career. Apprenticeships usually started with a month-long trial period to 
accommodate this. Adam Martindale (b.1623), for one, returned to school to prepare for 
university after a few weeks as an apprentice, his father seeing ‘which way my mind still 
went’.66  
 Family breakdown could also push a youth into an apprenticeship, but this was not its 
usual prompt. High rates of adult mortality meant that teenagers frequently lost one or both 
parents. Apprenticeship offered one way to manage the impact of death on the household. In 
the small port of Rye, Mayhew found that formal apprenticeship was primarily a way to settle 
orphans and migrants into stable homes.67 But apprenticeship was too extensive – and too 
expensive – to be primarily a mechanism for crisis resolution, and only a minority of children 
would be orphaned at the right age for apprenticeship to help. In London, Boston, Liverpool, 
Shrewsbury and Leicester, around a quarter of apprentices had lost their father. These are 
roughly the levels we would expect from adult mortality rates. Only Boston mirrored Rye: 75 
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percent of local apprentices had deceased fathers, compared to 28 percent of migrants. 
Elsewhere, the difference was small.  
 Ideally, we would now look at who did not become apprentices. How many artisan 
families trained their sons at home, perhaps lining them up to take over their workshop? How 
strictly did families stick to the north-west European norm of transferring adolescents to 
another household? Direct evidence is hard to obtain. Those sons who were not indentured 
are, generally, almost invisible. One partial indicator is the share of guild members who 
entered by inheritance, or ‘patrimony’. That freemen by patrimony were usually a small share 
of members suggests that most urban families did place children into apprenticeships. In 
Liverpool in the second half of the seventeenth century, only 11 percent became freemen by 
inheritance, in London 20 to 30 percent of freemen entered the Clothworkers, Merchant 
Taylors and Apothecaries guilds by inheritance. Unfortunately, these figures give a clearer 
indication of the openness of guilds and cities –ex-apprentices made up the vast majority of 
new freemen and citizens – than of the degree to which families trained their own. 
 The large scale of apprenticeship migration in England had one further effect: it 
overwhelmed any reliance on chains of family ties or regional clusters to guide 
relationships.68 London, particularly, recruited in such large numbers that most apprentices 
had no direct connection with their a master. The concentration of training with a minority of 
masters further limited the chance of joining someone known to the family. Masters were 
themselves likely to have migrated to London, but they usually came from a different place 
and county to their apprentices. Most apprentices’ fathers – 80 to 90 percent – were in 
different trades or sectors, removing the possibility of occupational ties. No doubt apprentices 
exploited kin ties where they existed, but most – 92 percent in London –joined masters with 
no obvious family link, judged by surname. Even in smaller cities, apprentices generally 
trained outside their families: apprentices and masters with different surnames account for 95 
percent of apprentices in Liverpool, 97 percent in Leicester, 85 percent in Bristol, 83 percent 
in Boston, 95 percent in Lincoln, 87 percent in Gloucester and 79 percent in Shrewsbury.69 
Kin ties increased as apprentices increasingly came from the area. But they were never the 
norm.  
Contracts made with masters outside families’ immediate networks often relied on 
intermediaries to bridge the gap. To give one example, George Bewley, travelled from 
Cumberland to bind himself to Edward Webb, a Dublin linen draper, after a travelling Quaker 
minister, Gershon Boat, ‘proposed to my parents their sending me to Dublin, in which City he 
thought he could readily provide me a Place’. Boat was true to his word, and soon after his 
return Webb wrote to Bewley’s parents asking for George to be sent over.70 
 Apprenticeship in England was a mechanism to shift out of the family trade, not 
reinforce it. It was a way to leave places, not stay in them. It was a solvent, in an already fluid 
society. We know that families took pains to identify good masters, and exploited 
connections to find opportunities, but the second or third degree ties they might have to 
masters via intermediaries such as Boat were weak, certainly too weak carry much weight in 
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avoiding abuse or disputes. As Mark Granovetter argued, weak ties are primarily important 
for information. These two fundamental aspects of English apprenticeship – the extent of 
migration and the scarcity of informal ties – are entangled with its institutional history and 
the approach to apprenticeship contract that developed. 
 
Institutions and the experience of service 
 How apprentices learned their crafts, and their experiences of life in new, often distant 
households, have left few traces. The one point when they do sometimes come to light is 
when an apprenticeship broke down. This process of breakdown – and the role of institutions 
in preventing or resolving disputes, and more generally in enforcing contracts – has attracted 
scrutiny in recent years, provoked by S R Epstein’s hypothesis that apprenticeship contract-
enforcement provided a positive role and justification for guilds.71 Apprenticeship operated 
with weakly specified contracts and time-inconsistent investments and payoffs. How might 
masters ensure that apprentices did not abscond once they were trained, or apprentices avoid 
being exploited as cheap labour by their masters? Did institutions intervene to help? 
 In England, at least, the question was ducked. Institutions made relatively few efforts 
to enforce apprenticeship contracts once the arrangement had been undermined. Enforcement 
was not impossible. The full force of the law was deployed against recalcitrant workers in the 
nineteenth century by magistrates and managers. They exploited the master-servant acts to 
prevent apprentices and other employees quitting.72 In the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, 
however, institutions favoured allowing exit over enforcement.  
 Doing so acknowledged the basic fluidity of early-modern apprenticeship. The 
impermanence of apprenticeship contracts can be illustrated for London and Bristol in the 
1690s, when listings of households allow us to observe the probability that apprentices were 
absence at different points in their terms.73 Figure 2 shows how apprentices drifted in slowly, 
often months after the clock had started. After three or four years, many then left – having 
served periods similar to those set in contracts in France and the Southern Netherlands. Some 
apprentices left service entirely. Others simply moved to a different master; turnovers were 
recorded formally for around one in ten apprentices.74 Those who stayed after the midpoint 
generally made it to the end. But once their terms were over, they would rapidly leave.  
 
[Figure 9.3 near here] 
 
 The spur for these premature departures varied. Apprentices might dislike the trade, 
squabble with their master, or be called home to support their family. Some fell in love; 
others into crime. One apprentice pewterer, John Walmesley, told his master’s maid that ‘he 
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would not stay … for that he had no mind to a handicraft trade’.75 Masters might force out 
apprentices if they discovered a fault – or simply wanted to avoid the cost of keeping them. 
Masters’ responsibilities included the potentially heavy burden of caring for apprentices who 
fell sick.76 Travelling or working in another household, even another country, to gain 
experience account for another group of apprentices, whose departures were temporary. An 
apprentice shipwright, Phineas Pett spent time away assisting two other master shipwrights.77 
For merchants’ apprentices, in particular, working as a factor abroad was often specified as 
part of the apprenticeship – a rare case of the content being detailed.  
 High rates of departure by apprentices – whether quits or transfers – affect the way in 
which training occurs under apprenticeship.78 A high risk of apprentices leaving will make 
masters reluctant to invest much in training. Masters instead will ensure that youths work 
enough to cover much of their costs as they go; unskilled tasks (sweeping, carrying, 
watching) allowed this. Premiums offer a different solution, off-setting masters’ investment. 
But we would still expect that instruction would have been slower, with apprentices more 
often left to ‘steal with their eyes’, than in a situation in which contracts were better enforced. 
 Exit found its institutional apogee in the Lord Mayor’s Court of London.79 At the 
epicentre of England’s market for apprenticeship, sitting in the Guildhall of the City of 
London, notionally headed by the Mayor himself, the Lord Mayor’s Court offered a rapid, 
affordable and accessible way for youths to abandon their indentures and, later, to recover 
part of their premium. By the later seventeenth century, over one in ten London apprentices 
used the Court. More apprentices were discharged there than existed in other English cities.  
Its process was simple. The youth entered a complaint against their master under one 
of a range of categories (turning them out, insufficient food or training etc.), the master was 
summoned, and – when he failed to appear, as most did – the apprentice was released from 
their contract, and allowed to find a new master (without losing the time served) or depart 
entirely.  
 The Court’s formal process concealed a messier reality. The most common plea was 
that a master had failed to enrol their apprentice’s contract with the City Chamberlain within 
a year. Against this breach of city law (and their freeman’s oath), no defence existed. 
Subsequent law suits in which apprentices sought to recover their premiums contain much 
gorier tales of abuse, neglect and malfeasance on both sides.80 Masters who starved and beat 
their apprentices. Apprentices who lied and stole.  
The dry formality of a non-enrolment plea concealed all sins. It also presented a 
paradox. For a master’s failure to fulfil a simple bureaucratic exercise left them with no way 
to defend any investment in their apprentice. We might reasonably suspect that both sides 
frequently understood this, and that the right to an easy exit was anticipated in negotiations 
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over an apprenticeship. In effect, these apprenticeship contracts were deliberately 
unenforceable. 
 Outside London, no town appears to have operated a court with the same dedicated 
process as London. To be fair, none had the same concentration of apprentices. Nonetheless, 
strong echoes of the system appear elsewhere. Enrolment was patchy in most cities where 
this requirement occurred.81 Exit was instead managed by magistrates. As Blackstone 
recounted, ‘Apprentices to trades may be discharged on reasonable cause, either at the 
request of themselves or masters, at the quarter sessions, or by one justice’, followed by 
‘direct restitution of a rateable share of the money given with the apprentice.’82 Discharges 
often concluded those disputes brought before Justices of the Peace; one West-Country broad 
weaver described how ‘A difference in opinion arose, and I went to a Magistrate and he 
released me’.83 In Gloucester, by the later seventeenth century, youths were being recorded as 
discharged ‘by order of the sessions’.84 London’s distinctive formal system reflected the 
sheer scale of apprenticeship in the city; it may also have provided an additional incentive for 
families to concentrate on the metropolis. 
 That apprenticeship might be ended cleanly and legally did not preclude other 
disciplinary processes.85 Masters retained and exercised the right to physically punish 
apprentices – apprentices protested against excessive correction, not violence per se. As 
subordinates within households, apprentices faced the same patriarchal authority as other 
servants, and children and wives. In London, the city launched repeated campaigns to 
improve the morality and deference of apprentices, who were enjoined to cut their hair, dress 
modestly, stay indoors at night, and not hunt, play football or dance.86 Guilds too might 
discipline apprentices, although examples only occur rarely. In London, the city’s 
Chamberlain heard complaints from masters and regularly prescribed whipping or periods of 
hard labour in the city’s gaols.  
 The possibility of exit heightened inequalities between apprentices. The Lord Mayor’s 
Court might have been cheap, but it was of most use to those who possessed sufficient 
familial resources and capital to survive the sacrifice of the time and money they had sunk 
into their first apprenticeship. Quitting early was costly; it could damage a youth’s 
reputation.87 The distribution of the early departures we observe in London and Bristol 
illustrates this.88 Wealthy migrant apprentices were more likely to leave; migrant labourers’ 
children were more likely to stay, as were youths with strong local connections. Apprentices 
who had better outside opportunities were more footloose than those with ties to the 
community. The price – and the opportunity cost – of exit was not equal for all. When the 
Essex clergyman Ralph Josselin’s son John quit his apprenticeship in London, it was a 
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disappointment to his father, who noted ‘sadness in my family, John returned’ in his diary. 
But John could return to his family home, his subsistence assured.89 One by-product of this 
was that masters demanded a higher premium from apprentices who were more likely to 
leave.90 Inequality was institutionalised in other ways in the eighteenth century, as Statute 
gave Justices of the Peace increasing powers of summary intervention into apprenticeships in 
which premiums were small or non-existent. Those who had spent substantial sums were only 
to be dealt with at the full Quarter Sessions. 
 Cities, magistrates and guilds had a much less clear role in the completion of an 
apprenticeship than they had in breaking contracts. No English guilds or cities are known to 
have monitored successful completions. There was no examination or certification waiting 
for apprentices. Those tests that did exist –fewer than half of London guilds required a 
‘masterpiece’– applied to individuals seeking guild membership.91 These were not portable 
proofs of ability and success. They carried no weight elsewhere, unlike the Lehrbrief issued 
by some Dutch and German guilds.  
 The link between apprenticeship and the testing of skills was vaguer even than this 
suggests. First, it is unclear how universally guilds employed examinations of new members 
even when the rule existed. In London, particularly, freemen often worked in – and trained 
apprentices – in trades that were not governed by their guild, rendering masterpieces moot. 
How, for instance, should the Coopers test a woollen draper? Secondly, despite guild rules 
that pressed apprentices to become freemen promptly, many waited for years, working as 
journeymen without entering the guild. In practice, few guilds were attentive enough to 
ensure that all journeymen were members – and some explicitly delayed any test until 
journeymen wished to set up as masters.92 As a result, most ex-apprentices would never take 
a mastership test.  
 Few apprentices would enter their masters’ guild or become urban citizens. Rates 
varied, but in general only around 40 percent of apprentices became freemen. This was not 
because of guild barriers. Most imposed relatively low fees; in London, they were capped by 
law at 3s 4d.93 Actual charges might be somewhat higher. 94 The most common loophole was 
for guilds to demand a ‘gift’, such as the silver spoon worth 13s 4d demanded by the 
Apothecaries and Wheelwrights.95 But even fee and spoon together was not a large sum, 
equating to perhaps ten days wages for an unskilled construction worker. Guild fees in 
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Sheffield’s Cutlers and Lincoln’s Tailors were at a similar level. Unusually, moreover, 
apprentices in London usually paid less than masters’ sons who had not been indentured in 
the guild.  
 For the remainder of apprentices, their only proof of service was a note from their 
master or the counterpart of their indentures to indicate that they had finished their term. It 
demonstrated their freedom from binding contractual obligations and right to work under the 
Statute, not skill. Certification of apprentices’ skills was an innovation that emerged as the 
state began investing in supplementary training for youths in the late nineteenth century.96 
With it, and not coincidentally, the state ensured that its subsidy (via funded technical 
training) paid off across the whole labour market. 
 
 Conclusion 
 Apprenticeship in early-modern England provided the main form of training outside 
of farming. It was a massive, relatively open and accessible system that may at times have 
included a majority of youths who were not employed in agriculture, and was widespread in 
both town and countryside. Paradoxically, it was made more attractive by a national legal 
framework that had been intended to keep labour on the land, and it remained central to the 
creation of vocational human capital through to the first industrial revolution and beyond. It 
allowed youths to invest in their own productivity in a period where firms were small and few 
jobs lasted for long. Working to pay for learning lowered credit constraints and allowed 
youths to immerse themselves in gaining tacit occupational skills. By accepting high rates of 
premature exits, and establishing an institutional framework to cancel contracts that were 
proving unsatisfactory to either party, the English system lowered the risks involved in 
choosing a master, a city, or a career and softened the burden that the exceptionally long 
terms of service that the Statute of Artificers had created. With few real barriers to entry set 
by either law or guild regulation, apprenticeship channelled labour from all backgrounds and 
all regions out of agriculture and into industry and services, and facilitated migration into 
cities, particularly London, which achieved an extraordinary dominance of urban training; it 
was a key vector in the extraordinary and precocious process of urbanisation and structural 
change in England that transformed the nation from an agrarian backwater to an industrial 
power.  
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 Figure 9.3: Proportion of London and Bristol apprentices resident with their master 
  
 Source: Minns and Wallis, ‘Rules and reality’. 
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